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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1643 
___________ 
 
KAROLINA KARPOV, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
VLADIMIR KARPOV; SVETLANA KARPOV 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 12-cv-01411) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 20, 2014 
 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 21, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In May 2012, Karolina Karpov (“Karolina”) commenced an action in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York against her adoptive parents, 
Vladimir Karpov (“Vladimir”) and Svetlana Karpov (“Svetlana”) (or together “the 
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Karpovs”) alleging that Vladimir sexually abused her when she was a minor and that 
Svetlana beat her for complaining about the abuse.  The complaint raised claims of  
assault, battery, and various other torts.
1
  Karolina sought monetary damages from the 
Karpovs.  Thereafter, the Karpovs filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.  The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the motion to dismiss 
insofar as the Karpovs sought a declaration that the District Court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over defendants, denied the motion insofar as it sought dismissal of the 
complaint, and directed the Clerk of Court to transfer the case to the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware, where it remains pending. 
 Karolina filed two motions for a preliminary injunction, both of which sought an 
order from the District Court directing Svetlana not to transfer any of the Karpovs’ 
property, including certain real estate.  Karolina argued that because she is likely to 
prevail on her claims against the Karpovs, if the Karpovs are permitted to transfer their 
property before judgment is entered, she will not be able to collect on the judgment.   
 Upon review, the District Court denied Karolina’s motions for a preliminary 
injunction.  Citing Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 
U.S. 308, 333 (1999), the District Court determined that it lacked the authority to grant 
the relief that Karolina requested under these circumstances.
2
  Alternatively, the District 
                                              
1
 Vladimir was convicted in state court on charges of abuse against Karolina.  It appears 
that he is still incarcerated as a result of those convictions. 
  
2
 In Grupo Mexicano, the Supreme Court held that an injunction freezing assets cannot be 
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Court determined that even if it had the authority to grant the relief Karolina requested, 
she failed to satisfy the legal standard for issuance of a preliminary injunction.  
Specifically, Karolina was unable to demonstrate that she will suffer immediate 
irreparable injury absent injunctive relief.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  Our standard of review 
is narrow.  Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 562 F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 
2009).  “Unless an abuse of discretion is ‘clearly established, or an obvious error has 
ocurred [sic] in the application of the law, or a serious and important mistake has been 
made in the consideration of the proof, the judgment of the trial court must be taken as 
presumptively correct.’”  Id. (citations omitted).  
 As recognized by the District Court, in determining whether a preliminary 
injunction should be issued, a court must consider the likelihood that the moving party 
will succeed on the merits, the extent to which the moving party will suffer irreparable 
harm if an injunction is not granted, the extent to which the nonmoving party will suffer 
irreparable harm if an injunction is issued, and the public interest.  Id. 
 We agree with the District Court that even assuming that it had the authority to 
grant the relief Karolina requested, she failed to satisfy the standard for issuance of a 
preliminary injunction.  Karolina has not provided any information to suggest that she  
will be placed in danger of immediate harm should the Karpovs transfer their property.  
                                                                                                                                                  
entered in an action for damages where no lien or equitable interest in the assets is 
claimed.  527 U.S. at 332-33.  
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See Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 
1980) (risk of irreparable harm means clear showing of immediate irreparable injury or 
presently existing actual threat).
3
  Further, even if Karolina ultimately prevails on her 
claims against the Karpovs, she has not demonstrated that the Karpovs will be unable to 
satisfy the judgment from the sale of their home, or via other personal assets. 
 As Karolina has the burden to establish every element of the four-part test for  
determining whether a preliminary injunction should be granted, her failure to  
show immediate irreparable injury alone establishes that she is not entitled to a  
preliminary injunction.  See Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, 40 F.3d 
1431, 1438 (3d Cir. 1994).  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
4
   
                                              
3
 We note that it is entirely speculative that the Karpovs will, in fact, transfer their 
property as Karolina suggests. 
 
4
 The District Court’s order also denies various other motions filed by Karolina, including 
a motion to compel the Delaware Department of Justice to produce certain documents.  
We do not have jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) to review those other orders at this time. 
